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Abstract 
We investigate the effect of the 20 largest – in terms of insured 
losses – man-made or natural disasters on the insurance 
industry. We show via an event study that insurance markets 
worldwide are quite resilient to unexpected losses to capital 
and are even outperforming the general market subsequent to 
great disasters. 
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1. Introduction 
Large scale disasters, whether man-made such as the terrorist attack on the World 
Trade Center in 2001, or natural such as the recent tsunami catastrophe in the Indian 
Ocean, need not necessarily imply a disaster for the insurance industry. There is a well 
documented tendency (see e.g. Shelor et al. 1992 or Cummins and Danzon 1997) for 
premiums to rise after such events which might or might not outweigh unexpected 
losses to capital. 
The mechanism which establishes a new market equilibrium subsequent to such 
catastrophes is discussed in detail elsewhere (see e.g. Gron 1994, Froot and O'Connel 
1999, or Cummins and Lewis 2002) and shall not concern us here. Rather, we answer 
the empirical question whether disaster-related factors which raise premiums, such as 
an outward shift of the demand curve or a decrease in the supply of insurance induced 
by an increase in the cost of capital (Cummins and Danzon 1997), are able to 
overcompensate the adverse shock to equity, at least in the eyes of investors. To this 
extent, we examine the 20 all-time most costly disasters (in terms of insured property 
losses) and determine via an event-study whether the insurance-industry experienced 
any positive or negative abnormal returns thereafter. Positive abnormal returns 
subsequent to a shock are interpreted as evidence that investors believe that premium 
increases will be sufficient to make up for capital losses resulting from the disaster, 
while negative abnormal returns are interpreted as indicating the opposite. 
There is ample evidence that the disasters in our study can indeed be viewed as 
unexpected shocks not fully anticipated in premium pricing. This is most obviously 
true for the September 11 terrorist attacks. Prior to these attacks, terrorism cover was 
generally not a separate line of insurance. Typically, it was not even mentioned in 
insurance policies and (all-risk physical damage) policies would automatically cover 
losses associated with such events, as the risk was perceived to be insignificantly low. 
Previous terrorist attacks in the United States like the first WTC bombing in 1993 or 
the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 were discounted as non-recurring events in a 
world were attacks on U.S. life and property occurred exclusively outside the United 
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States. In the case of natural catastrophes such as Hurricane Andrew or the Northridge 
earthquake, insurers were aware of the potential hazard, but seemed to underestimate 
both the probability and the severity of the events. This is what transpires from a 
perusal of the specialized insurance literature and it is also reflected in the large 
discrepancy between insured losses and premium incomes collected prior to the 
events. For example, it has been reported that insurance companies’ pay-outs related 
to Hurricane Andrew in Florida exceeded by 50 per cent all premiums collected in that 
state for the past 22 years, while insured losses related to the Northridge earthquake 
alone were equal to the entire amount of premiums collected in the 20th century for 
earthquake insurance (Arnold 2002). Many industry observers have argued that in 
general the premiums collected during the 1990s were too low to compensate for the 
large pay-outs related to natural catastrophes during that decade, which included 
typhoons in Japan and winterstorms in Europe. 
Below we investigate whether or not such unexpected losses are compensated by 
subsequent changes of parameters in the insurance industry. Other than most previous 
investigations of the effects of disasters on the insurance industry, we broaden our 
data base to also include disasters and markets outside the US. Contrary to e. g. aiuppa 
et al (1993), Lamb (1995) or Cummins and Lewis (2002), we also focus on the 
insurance industry as such, not on individual insurance companies. We also use three 
different estimates of abnormal returns to make sure that our results are not an artifact 
of the procedure which is employed to isolate the effect of an event. 
 
2. The models and the data 
Table 1, based on estimates reported by Swiss Re (2004), lists the disasters included in 
our study. It is headed by the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, closely followed 
by Hurricane Andrew, which in August 1992 struck South Florida, Louisiana and the 
Bahamas with winds of up to 140 miles an hour, and the Northridge earthquake in 
1994. As the table only lists property and business interruption losses, excluding life 
and liability insurance losses, the overall insured losses from the September 11 
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Table 1: The 20 worst catastrophes in terms of insured losses 
Insured loss1  Date Event Country 
21.062 11.09.2001 Terrorist attacks on WTC, 
Pentagon and other buildings 
United States 
20.900 23.08.1992 Hurricane Andrew United States 
17.312 17.01.1994 Northridge earthquake United States 
11.000 
7.598 
02.09.2004 
27.09.1991 
Hurricane Ivan 
Typhoon Mireille 
United States 
Japan 
7.000 
6.441 
11.08.2004 
25.01.1990 
Hurricane Charley 
Winterstorm Daria 
United States 
France, United 
Kingdom, 
Germany 
6.382 25.12.1999 Winterstorm Lothar France, 
Switzerland, 
Germany 
6.203 15.09.1989 Hurricane Hugo United States 
5.000 
4.839 
26.08.2004 
16.10.1987 
Hurricane Frances 
Storm and floods in Europe 
United States 
France, UK,  
Netherlands 
4.476 25.02.1990 Winterstorm Vivian France, Germany, 
Switzerland, UK, 
Netherlands 
4.445 22.09.1999 Typhoon Bart Japan 
4.000 
3.969 
13.09.2004 
28.09.1998 
Hurricane Jeanne 
Hurricane George 
United States 
United States 
3.261 05.06.2001 Tropical storm Allison United States 
3.205 02.05.2003 Thunderstorms, tornadoes, hail United States 
3.100 06.07.1988 Explosion on Piper Alpha 
drilling platform 
United Kingdom 
1 In USD millions, indexed to 2003. Only insured property losses. Losses for 2004 are 
preliminary estimates. For hurricanes, event dates dates indicate landfall. Source: Swiss Re 
(2004a,b) and author additions. 
terrorist attacks, and also from some of the other catastrophes, are of course much 
higher than indicated in the table. As regards the areas affected, the United States are 
the country most often hit by the catastrophic events shown in Table 1. They 
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experienced eleven events from different categories, including hurricanes, terrorist 
attacks, earthquakes and storms, with four hurricanes occurring in 2004 alone. Japan 
experienced three typhoons and one earthquake. Europe was hit by three winterstorms 
in 1990 and 1999 and by storm and floods in 1987 which affected more than one 
country at a time, and an explosion on a drilling platform in 1988. 
The ranking in table 1 does not correspond to catastrophes in terms of victims. The 
most costly disaster in this respect in modern times, the 1970 storm and flood 
catastrophes in Bangladesh and the recent tsunami in the Indian ocean, both with a 
cost of about 300,000 lives, are not even included in table 1. Similarly, the earthquake 
in Tangshan in China in 1976, with 250,000 victims, or the tropical Cyclone Gorki in 
1991, with 140,00 victims, although gigantic catastrophes in almost any sense, did not 
induce heavy insurance losses in absolute dollar terms, and are therefore also not 
included in the table.  
For each disaster, and for each country involved, we estimated normal and abnormal 
returns of the respective insurance industries in three different ways. First, via the 
conventional market model (MacKinlay 1997) 
(1) Rit = αi + βi Rmt + εit , 
where Rit is the return of an index of the insurance industry in period t, and Rmt is the 
return of a broad market index in that period, and where αi + βi Rmt is the “normal” 
return to be estimated from the data. Data are daily and range from event day – 200 to 
event day – 1. Second, via the market-adjusted return model where αi = 0 and βi= 1. 
This is mainly to avoid the well known problem of correlation between the regressor 
and the disturbance term in (1) induced by non-synchronous trading (see e.g. Brown 
and Warner 1985), which renders conventional least squares estimates of βi 
inconsistent. As we are using indices rather than individual firms, this potential bias 
does not seem to be very important here, but it is still useful to have alternative 
measures of abnormal returns. We therefore also used the constant expected returns 
model where we set normal returns equal to zero. In addition to providing yet another 
measure of abnormal performance, this also circumvents the problem that large-scale 
 6 
disasters may affect the market (which may be expected almost by the definition of 
such event), which would imply that both the marked-model based and the marked-
adjusted abnormal returns do not capture all of the effects of an event. 
Following the disaster, we therefore computed daily abnormal returns for the 
respective local insurance sector via either 
(2) mtiiitit RˆˆRAR β−α−= , 
where iαˆ  and iˆβ , respectively, are estimates for iα  and iβ  from (1) (the market 
model), or 
(3) AR*it = Rit – Rmt 
(the market adjusted returns model), or 
(4) AR**it = Rit 
(the constant expected returns model). The subscript i (i=1,.., 20) indicates the 
disaster, Rit is the return of the local insurcance sector (either USA, Japan or Western 
Europe) on event day t, and Rmt is the return of the local stock market. Both the total 
market and insurance industry indices were obtained from Thompson Financial 
Datastream. The indices for Europe cover mainly the EU (as of 1995) plus 
Switzerland, which are at the same time the countries affected by the disasters under 
study here. 
In every case, the event window ranges from the event day to event day + 29. 
 
3. Results 
Table 2 gives the estimates of the respective marked models. It exhibits a considerable 
variation in regression estimates, even for a given market, which is not compatible 
with a constant market model across the whole data set. Although the conventional 
CUSUM-tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are  
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Table 2: Least Squares estimates of the market model 
Event OLS-estimate 
 
OLS-estimate 
 
R2 
09/11 terrorist attacks -0.00031 0,45 0,28 
Hurricane Andrew 0,00007 0,78 0,62 
Northridge earthquake -0,00032 0,87 0,41 
Hurricane Ivan 0,00027 0,77 0,66 
Typhoon Mireille 0,00023 0,94 0,66 
Hurricane Charley 0,00030 0,75 0,64 
Winterstorm Daria 0,00034 1,04 0,76 
Winterstorm Lothar -0,00090 1,16 0,70 
Hurricane Hugo 0,00065 0,85 0,68 
Hurricane Frances 0,00034 0,78 0,68 
Storms and Floods -0,00087 0,90 0,45 
Winterstorm Vivian 0,00049 1,06 0,79 
Typhoon Bart -0,00172 0,86 0,37 
Hurricane Jeanne 0,00026 0,77 0,66 
Hurricane George -0,00005 0,90 0,79 
Tropical Storm Allison 0,00071 0,49 0,26 
Tornados 0,00008 0,94 0,78 
Piper alpha -0,00014 0,95 0,76 
Kobe earthquake -0,00010 1,10 0,58 
Typhoon Songda 0,00032. 1,31 0,53 
 
constant throughout the 1987-2004 period which is spanned by the events under study, 
a standard Chow-test, when for instance applied to the combined n=400 data points 
which were used for the estimation of the market model prior to Hurricane Andrew 
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and the 9/11-attacks, clearly rejects the hypothesis of parameter constancy (CUSUM-
tests fail to do so mainly because in the present context, structural changes are almost 
orthogonal to the mean regressor, which leads to a very poor power of the tests; see 
Ploberger and Krämer 1990, 1992). For small subsets of the data of length n=230, 
which were used to estimate the market model and to compute abnormal returns 
around a particular disaster, the assumption of parameter constancy can however 
much more easily be maintained. 
Figure 1 shows the cumulated excess returns, as computed according to the methods 
described in section 3. For each event day t, the 20 abnormal returns were averaged 
(arithmetic mean) prior to cumulating. No matter which measure of abnormal 
performance is used, the insurance sector suffers on the day of the disaster, but soon 
recovers according to market-model and market-adjusted returns, even outperforming 
the market about one week after the disaster, with a small and insignificant negative 
cumulated return at the end of the post event window. 
Figure 1: cumulated abnormal returns
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Cumulated unadjusted returns are however negative on average throughout, and 
significantly so (see below). This is mainly due to the fact that the European and 
Japanese markets were in general negative subsequent to most disasters. Also, the post 
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event window for the 1987 European flood catastrophe includes the October 87 stock 
market crash, with a decline in the total market index within the post event window of 
24%. One these movements of the market are accounted for, remaining returns are 
only slightly negative or even positive, as seen in figures 2 and 3, which depict 
abnormal returns for the European and Japanese markets separately. 
Figure 2: cumulated abnormal returns Europe
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Figure 3: cumulated abnormal returns Japan
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In the US, both the total market and the insurance industry recover fast and show 
positive returns soon after a disaster. For instance, while both the total market and the 
insurance industry declined by about 5% on the day trading resumed after the 
September 11 attack, they registered a 1% (market) and  8% (insurance industry only) 
increase over the whole post event window. After hurricane Andrew, the insurance 
sector declined by 1.1% on day one but increased by 6.8% over the whole post event 
window (while the rest of the market remained flat). As is seen in figure 4, both the 
economy in general and the insurance industry in particular do not seem to suffer 
much from catastrophes like this. 
Figure 4: cumulated abnormal returns USA
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This conclusion is also born out by a formal test of statistical significance. Table 3 
shows the abnormal returns as computed according our models, together with 
estimates of the respective standard deviations. The standard estimate of the standard 
deviation was obtained by computing, for each event i, and for each estimation 
window, the empirical variances S2i of the abnormal returns form the marked model, 
the market adjustment model and the constant expected returns model. An estimate Si 
of the standard deviation of the day 1 abnormal average return is then obtained from 
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(5) Si = ((S21 + … + S220)/400))1/2 
and an estimate of the standard deviation of the cumulated returns is obtained by 
multiplying this expression by 301/2. 
 
Table 3: Average abnormal returns and standard deviations 
average returns 
market model constant exp. 
returns 
market adjusted 
returns 
a) on event day 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimate of  
standard diviation 
-0.0051 --0.0061 -0.0034 
standard 0.0016 0.0025 0.0023 
sample 0.0091 0.0173 0.077 
 b) cumulated over days 1,…,30 
 -0.0037 -0.0145 -0.0044 
standard 0.0088 0.0137 0.0125 
sample 0.0279 0.0614 0.0406 
 
In the case of the market model, these expressions must be augmented by a term 
which accounts for the error in estimating the coefficients of the model. These terms 
are however rather small for an estimating window of length 200 an can be neglected. 
Also, there is some overlap in the post event windows of the 2004 hurricanes which 
induces positive correlation among the respective cumulated abnormal returns, which 
in turn leads to an underestimation of the variance (see e.g. Krämer and Kiviet 1992). 
As this overlap affects only 4 of the 20 events, this effect is likewise here neglected. 
A much more serious drawback is a possible increase in the return variance induced 
by the event (Boehmer et al. 1991). We have checked this for our sample and have 
 12 
indeed found a larger empirical variance subsequent to the event in almost all cases. 
Therefore, table 3 also shows alternative estimates of the abnormal returns standard 
deviations by simply taking the empirical standard deviations of the observed returns. 
These estimates are less precise if there is no event induced increase in the variance, 
but more reliable if the variance does indeed increase. 
Keeping these caveats in mind, table 3 confirms what we have already seen in figures 
1 -4: There is a statistically significant negative abnormal return on event day 1 (at 
least if we confine ourselves to the market and constant expected return models and to 
the standard variance estimates), while the null hypothesis that there is no cumulated 
abnormal return at the end of the event window cannot be rejected regardless of the 
model and the variance estimate which we use. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Our empirical findings are unequivocal in that large scale desasters do not negatively 
affect the insurance industry as a whole. Adverse shocks to equity are compensated by 
either outward shifts of the demand curve or a demand independent ability to raise 
premiums or both. This confirms recent results on total markets by Chen and Siems 
(2004), but is in stark contrast to the finding by Brown et al (2004) that government 
interventions which are designed to mitigate the effects of disasters do not help the 
industry at all. 
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